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SUBTRACTING RACE FROM THE "REASONABLE
CALCULUS": AN END TO RACIAL PROFILING?
UNITED STATES V. MONTERO-CAMAR GO,
208 F.3D 1122 (9TH CIR. 2000) CERT. DENIED SUB NOM
Elisabeth R. Calcaterra*
Natalie G. Mitchell*
The federal government's 1998 "Buckle Up America" campaign, an
effort to increase seat belt use, had the potential of preventing needless
tragedies. The campaign's goal was to make the failure to wear seatbelts
a primary offense nationwide, thereby permitting officers to stop vehicles
in which occupants were not "buckled up." 2 Minority communities
were expected to benefit the most from the bill, as young African
Americans and Latinos are more likely to die in car accidents than
Whites because of failure to wear seatbelts.
3
But soon after the campaign was launched, minority civic organiza-
tions' support began to flag.' The Urban League expressed its concern to
the Department of Transportation that its members feared the primary
seatbelt enforcement laws would simply give the police another tool with
which to harass minority drivers.' The League said that it could not sign
on to the campaign without assurances "that the necessary protections
will be put in to ensure that black people and other people of color
specifically are not subject to arbitrary stops by police under the guise of
enforcement of seat belt laws.",6 Such has been the effect of racial profil-
ing on minority communities: a law encouraging the use of seat belts is
viewed first as an opportunity for police to make arbitrary traffic stops,
and second as a measure to save lives. Taking a step to prevent this per-
vasive police practice of racial profiling, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held, in United States v. Montero-Camargo,7 that race may not be
used as a factor to determine the reasonableness of a traffic stop.
This Case Note presents the facts of Montero-Camargo, describes the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court in historical context, and analyzes
the effect of the Court's holding. The Case Note argues that while the
* Executive Editor, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 7.
** Contributing Editor, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 7.
1. See David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and The Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 306-07 (1999).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 307 (citation omitted).
7. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez-Guillen v. United
States, 121 S. Ct. 211 (2000).
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Ninth Circuit's decision to prohibit the use of race as a factor in deter-
mining the reasonableness calculus in traffic stops is progressive in spirit,
implementing the decision will be difficult. Thus far, mechanisms de-
signed to limit officers' use of race in traffic stops have been ineffective
and have left victims with little recourse, resulting in a disproportionate
number of innocent African American and Latino drivers being stopped
pretextually. 8
The facts of Montero-Camargo are uncontested. On an October af-
ternoon in 1996, German Espinoza Montero-Camargo and Lorenzo
Sanchez-Guillen, the former driving a Chevy Blazer and the latter a
Nissan sedan, were traveling with Mexicali plates on a California high-
way about fifty miles from the Mexican border when they were stopped
by border patrol agents.9 Following a tip that the drivers made U-turns
shortly before the El Centro border patrol checkpoint, the agents got
into separate marked cars and drove south to investigate."' About a mile
from the checkpoint, the agents saw the vehicles re-entering the highway
after pulling off the shoulder in an area allegedly known for picking up
undocumented aliens and illegal drugs."i
One agent pulled behind the Blazer while the other followed the
Nissan sedan for four miles before stopping it.'2 The officer driving be-
hind the Blazer noticed that the passenger glanced in the rearview mirror
and then picked up a newspaper and appeared to begin reading. 13 The
officer then stopped the Blazer and asked about the occupants' citizen-
ship. 4 When the officer surmised the occupants were traveling too far
from the border as indicated by their identification cards, they were
brought to the checkpoint for processing. 5 In the meantime, the officers
stopped the Nissan sedan, searched the trunk, and found two large bags
8. A 1994 statistical report of traffic stops along the New Jersey Turnpike revealed
that while there was little difference in the rate at which Blacks and Whites committed
traffic violations, 73.2% of those stopped and arrested were Black. The study concluded
that Blacks had a higher chance of being stopped by the New Jersey State Police on the
turnpike than Whites. Harris, supra note 1, at 277-79; see also Sean Hecker, Race and
Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role For Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 551, 563-65 (1997).
9. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1126-27.
10. Id. at 1126.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1127-28.
13. Id. at 1127.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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of marijuana. 16 A subsequent search of the Blazer turned up a loaded
pistol in the glove compartment and an ammunition clip that fit the
pistol in the passenger's purse."
At trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California, Montero-Camargo, Sanchez-Guillen, the passenger in the
Blazer, and Renteria-Wolff were convicted of conspiracy to possess
marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 8
Sanchez-Guillen was also convicted of being an alien in possession of
ammunition and aiding and abetting the carrying of a firearm during the
.... 19
commission of a drug trafficking crime. The three defendants filed a
pre-trail motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the vehicle
20
stop was not based on reasonable suspicion.
The District Court denied the motion to suppress, conceding that
the government's case was "somewhat weak," but concluding that, given
the scenarios the officers encountered at each of the stops, the officers
had sufficient suspicion to make an investigatory stop. 2 1 The factors the
District Court considered included (1) the civilian's tip about the U-turn
made in the middle of the highway, just before the checkpoint; (2) the
alleged driving in tandem and the Mexicali license plates, which sup-
ported the informant's allegations; (3) the nature of the U-turn spot in
question; (4) the defendant's Hispanic appearance; and (5) the fact that
the passenger in the Blazer picked up a newspaper as the border patrol
22
car approached.
Montero-Camargo entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy
to possess and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. He
reserved the right to challenge on appeal two of the district court's de-
23
terminations, including the denial of the motion to suppress. Sanchez-
Guillen proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of conspiracy to
possess and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, as well
24
as of being an illegal alien in possession of ammunition.
On appeal, Montero-Camargo and Sanchez-Guillen argued that the
district court erred in denying their motion to suppress. 2" The Ninth
26
Circuit panel agreed with the district court's conclusion.
16. Id. at 1128.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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The appeal was heard en banc by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court and the panel majority's deci-
sion, although on a more selective set of factors. Judge Reinhardt,
writing for the majority, addressed the question of whether the border
patrol agents had a reasonable suspicion when they pulled over the de-
fendants. Finding that they did, the court indicated that the U-turn, the
area in which the defendants completed the U-turn, the in-tandem
driving, and the Mexicali license plates were relevant factors in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion. 2 ' The court rejected the District Court's
finding that Renteria-Wolff's behavior, her quick glance in the rearview
mirror and newspaper reading, could be an appropriate factor.29 Most
importantly, however, the court held that the district court should not
have included the drivers' Hispanic appearance as a factor in the reason-
able suspicion calculus.
30
II
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding, that race cannot be a
factor in an officer's calculation of reasonable suspicion when stopping a
vehicle, is a victory for African American and Latino drivers. However,
the victory is limited in light of the decades of Supreme Court decisions
that has expanded police discretion in vehicle stops while discouraging
plaintiffs' claims of racial discrimination at the hands of police officers,
legislators' aborted attempts to collect statistics on police stops, and nega-
tive attitudes and beliefs about minority citizens reflected in police
practice.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be
free from search and seizure.3 1 With society's increased reliance on the
automobile, necessity prompted the Supreme Court to allow police with
probable cause to conduct warrantless stops and searches of vehicles;
without the "automobile exception" the requirement that officers leave
the scene of the stop to obtain a warrant would have provided the sus-
32pect with an opportunity to drive away. But it was Terry v. Ohio,33 the
27. Id. at 1126.
28. Id. at 1138-39.
29. Id. at 1135-36.
30. Id. at 1135.
31. The Fourth Amendment states that "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated .... ".U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
32. See Harris, supra note 1, at 310.
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Tery, an on-duty police officer observed three men, two
African American and one White, milling around outside a jewelry store in downtown
Cleveland. As the men separately walked by the store, each looking through the store
[VOL. 6:339
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landmark case that introduced the concept of investigatory stops, that
marked the beginning of the Supreme Court's movement toward en-
larging police discretion. Applying Terry to vehicle stops, officers were
given little incentive to forsake the use of race as a factor in deciding
which motorists to pull over and investigate.
In response to the charge that the arresting officer's behavior vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Terry Court held that a police officer may briefly "stop
and frisk" a person without a warrant or probable cause, provided that
the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that "criminal activity
may be afoot," and that the suspect is armed and dangerous.34 The offi-
cer's decision to stop and frisk cannot be based on intuition or a hunch,
but must be grounded in observations, training, and "the specific reason-
able inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
- 135 36experience. The stop must be brief, and the scope of the search must
37be restricted to the suspect's outer clothing, in order to find weapons.
Despite the court's attempt to limit its decision, the concept of sufficient
cause to authorize police to stop a suspect remains vague and prone to
abuse:
The indeterminate nature of the standard makes it easy for
police officers who stop someone for discriminatory rea-
sons, or for no reason at all, to later justify the stop by
articulating other benign reasons .... Moreover, the lack
of specificity inherent in the reasonable articulable suspicion
standard permits law enforcement officers to use race as a
factor in justifying their suspicion.
38
Given the ambiguous standard articulated in Terry, the en banc Court
of Appeals holding in Montero-Cam ago could easily be circumvented by
an officer who intends to continue stopping drivers based on their race,
but later justifies those stops through legal rationale.
window as he passed, and then meeting his companions, the officer became suspicious
that the group was planning an armed robbery. The officer, a White male, then ap-
proached the men and asked their names. When he received only a mumbled response,
the officer frisked the men, seized weapons from two, and arrested all three. Id. at 1-2.
34. Id. at 30.
35. Id. at 27.
36. See id. at 26.
37. See id. at 29-30.
38. Randall S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 327, 332-33 (1994) (analyzing the role of race in police-citizen encoun-
ters).
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In United States v. Cortez, the Supreme Court broadened the scope
of police officers' discretion in interpreting the reasonable suspicion
standard by instructing lower courts to defer to the testifying officer's
judgment. In assessing whether the officers made an appropriate deter-
mination of particularized suspicion, the Court remarked that a trained
officers' inferences and deductions may "elude an untrained person'41
and that evidence collected by officers "must be seen and weighed not in
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement. ' 42 In effect, the Court encouraged the
lower courts to consider police testimony as that of experts, worthy of
deference. This practice of deference to police officers' decisions will
further frustrate the goal of the Montero-Camargo ruling. After Montero-
Camargo, should the Court break with precedent and challenge an offi-
cer's interpretation of reasonable suspicion if race seems to have played a
role in her decision to stop a driver, or should the Court defer to the
officer's expert judgment?
In Ihren v. United States,43 police power was dramatically expanded
with the Court's ruling that police may make pretextual traffic stops. The
Court held that, as long as a traffic offense has occurred, an officer has
probable cause to stop a vehicle.44 While the petitioners agreed that the
officer had probable cause to believe that the traffic code had been vio-
lated, they argued that, in the context of civil traffic regulations, probable
cause is not enough. 4' As the traffic code is so highly regulated, a persis-
tent officer will almost invariably catch any motorist in a technical
violation.46 The petitioners argued that police officers may use the op-
39. 449 U.S. 441 (1981). In Cortez, Border Patrol officers stopped a truck driven by
persons the officer believed were smuggling illegal aliens into the United States from
Mexico. The officers targeted the truck after they discovered sets of distinctive human
footprints in the Arizona desert; the footprints led the officers to believe that aliens were
being led across the desert to a pickup point on an isolated stretch of highway. Id. at 413-
15. The Court held that the officers' stop was constitutional: the test was whether, based
on the whole picture, the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped for criminal activity. Id. at 417-18, 421-22.
40. Id. at 418.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
44. See id. at 809, 813.
45. Id. at 810.
46. Id. The Whren Court has granted the police an extremely powerful tool in the
use of traffic code. Harris writes that:
These codes regulate the details of driving in ways both big and small,
obvious and arcane. In the most literal sense, no driver can avoid violat-
ing some traffic law during a short drive, even with the most careful
attention. Fairly read, Whren says that any traffic violation can support a
[VOL. 6:339
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portunity to investigate other violations of the law for which no probable
cause or articulable suspicion exists.47 Significantly, petitioners also argued
that police officers might decide which motorists to stop based on im-
permissible factors, such as the race of the car's occupants.48 The Court
sided with the government, finding that if law enforcement officials
observe a traffic violation, they have the simplest and clearest type of
probable cause imaginable for a stop. 49 The Court only briefly addressed
the petitioners' concern that race may play a role in traffic stops: as a
remedy for discriminatory pretextual traffic stops, it stated that subjective
intentions "play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment
analysis" s° and suggested that the Equal Protection Clause is the appro-
priate constitutional basis for challenging the stops."
Whren dealt a dual blow to African American and Latino drivers by
expanding the discretionary power of the police and removing race from
Fourth Amendment protection. s2 Bringing a successful equal protection
stop no matter what the real reason for it is; this makes any citizen fair
game for a stop, almost any time, anywhere, virtually at the whim of po-
lice.
David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997).
47. Whern, 517 U.S. at 810.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 813.
51. Id.
52. The question of remedy is a difficult one. A criminal defendant who has proven
that she was singled out based on her race would not be able to have her indictment
dismissed or any evidence suppressed under the Equal Protection Clause. Hecker, supra
note 8, at 588 (citing Developments in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1472, 1498 (1988)). Another option for the motorist is to file a claim under 42
U.S.C. 5 1983 basing the action on the officer's denial of her equal protection because
she was stopped on the basis of her race. If motorist brought a successful claim she could
receive damages or injunctive relief. See Hecker, supra note 8, at 588.; see also Angela J.
Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 435, 435 n.75 (1997). 42
U.S.C. 5 1983 (1994) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usuage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the ju-
risdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
Id. However, it is unlikely motorists singled out because of their race would bring an
action under § 1983 due to financial impracticability and because such actions may bring
attention to criminal activity, a jury would be unlikely to grant relief Hecker, supra note
8, at 589; see also Davis, supra at 436 n.78. It would also be difficult for a court to grant
SPRING 2001]
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claim is nearly an insurmountable task. Traditional equal protection
analysis requires that the defendant prove that an officer intentionally
discriminated against her based on her race. The defendant must show
that prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose.54 But showing that a minority
55
motorist was detained on the basis of race is difficult to prove.
In United States v. Armstrong,56 the Court established the standard for
discovery in criminal cases in which the defendant alleges race-based
selective prosecution. The Court held that in order to obtain discovery,
the defendant must show that the government declined to prosecute
similarly-situated suspects of other races.57 In Armstrong, the defendants,
Black men, were indicted for selling crack and using a firearm in connec-
tion with drug trafficking.58 When the defendants supported their claim of
selective prosecution with a study showing that all 24 crack-cocaine cases
closed by the district's federal public defender in the preceding year in-
volved Black defendants, the Court found the evidence insufficient.
The Court made the task of proving a selective prosecution claim
even more arduous by holding that the defendant must first show that
the government declined to prosecute similarly-situated suspects of other, 60
races before he may access the prosecutor s files. Thus, "the defendant
must furnish evidence of the correctness of his claim, without access to
the very evidence needed to prove his claim-a Catch 22 if ever there
was one."6 ' If an African American or Latino driver alleged that a police
officer's use of a pretextual traffic stop constituted a denial of equal pro-
tection, he would need to show that similarly-situated White motorists
62
could have been stopped, detained, or arrested, but were not. Such
evidence would be impossible to procure, because "[p]olice officers do
injunctive relief because how would a court enjoin police officers from conducting
pretextual stops? Id. at 436.
53. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
54. See id. at 239.
55. See Davis, supra note 52, at 437 (citing Charles R. Lawerence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319-23
(1987)) (stating that discrimination on the basis of race is difficult to prove because it is
difficult to prove "invidious discrimination" by the police officer).
56. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
57. Id. at 458.
58. Id. at 458-59.
59. See Harris, supra note 46, at 552 (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459).
60. Id. at 552.
61. Id. at 552-53 (citing David Cole, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, LEGAL TIMES, July
29, 1996, at S29).
62. See Davis, supra note 52, at 437-38.
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not keep records of instances in which they could have stopped a mo-
torist for a traffic violation, but did not.
63
Even when there are instances in which statistical evidence is avail-
able to demonstrate constitutional violations, the Court has not looked
favorably upon it.64 In McCleskey v. Kemp,6s the defendant, a Black man,
was convicted in a Georgia trial court of armed robbery and murder.
66
The jury recommended the death penalty, and the defendant appealed
the decision, claiming that the Georgia capital sentencing process was67
administered in a racist manner. The defendant supported his claim
with a statistical study that purported to show a disparity in the imposi-
tion of the death sentence in Georgia based on the murder victim's and
the defendant's race. 6' Despite the correlation that the statistics seemed to
show between the perpetrator's race and the likelihood that the perpe-
trator would be sentenced to death, the Court found that the study did
not support an inference that McCleskey's sentence rested on purposeful
.... 69
discrimination. The Court found that a petitioner would have to pres-
ent evidence that "the decision makers in his case acted with a
discriminatory purpose." 70 By this ruling, the Court disallows proof of
patterns of racial bias to support equal protection violation claims, fore-
closing a logical avenue to demonstrate a discriminatory application of
the law.a"
Extra-judicial efforts to prevent police officers from relying on race
as a factor in conducting traffic stops have been met with only tepid
enthusiasm. Federal legislation, such as the Traffic Stops Statistics Study
Act of 1999,72 aimed at requiring officers to collect data on traffic stops,
was billed as a tool to help demonstrate that minority communities'
63. Id. at 438; see also Susskind, supra note 38, at 341.
64. "The Court has accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in certain
limited contexts." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987) (emphasis added).
65. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
66. Id. at 283. The convictions stemmed from the robbery of a furniture store and
the killing of a White police officer during the course of the robbery.
67. Id. at 286.
68. Id. The Baldus study was comprised of two statistical studies analyzing murder
cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970's. The study revealed that while defen-
dants convicted of killing Black individuals only received the death penalty in 1% of the
cases, 11% of defendants convicted of killing a White individual received the death
penalty. The Baldus study concluded that Black defendants were more likely to receive
the death penalty than White defendants and that Black defendants who are convicted of
killing White victims are the most likely to receive the death penalty. Id.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See Harris, supra note 46, at 552.
72. H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999).
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complaints of racial profiling were not unfounded.13 John Conyers, a
Democrat from Michigan, introduced the bill in 19977' and it was passed• 75
by the House of Representatives. When the bill reached the Senate it
met with failure, largely due to the opposition of the International Asso-
ciation of Chiefs of Police, who argued that making officers record such
data would "discourage [officers] from making legitimate traffic stops for
fear of action being taken against them or their department. 76 Regardless
of the possibility that officers could anonymously record and submit data,
77
the bill has been resubmitted twice and its future is uncertain.
73. Under this proposed legislation, an effort to collect data on traffic stops would be
directed up by the Attorney General. Analysis of this data would be divided into two
phases. First, the "initial analysis" of existing data would be conducted by the Attorney
General, "including complaints alleging and other information concerning traffic stops
motivated by race and other bias." Id. at § 2(a)(2). After the initial analysis, the Attorney
General would collect data on traffic stops at a nationwide level. The following data
would be collected in the second phase:
(A) The traffic infraction alleged to have been committed that led to the
stop.
(B) Identifying characteristics of the driver stopped, including the race,
gender, ethnicity, and approximate age of the driver.
(C) Whether immigration status was questioned, immigration documents
were requested, or an inquiry made to the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service with regard to any person in the vehicle.
(D) The number of individuals in the stopped vehicle.
(E) Whether a search was instituted as a result of the stop and whether
consent was requested for the search.
(F) Any alleged criminal behavior by the driver that justified the search.
(G) Any items seized, including contraband or money.
(H) Whether any warning or citation was issued as a result of the stop.
(I) Whether an arrest was made as a result of either the stop or the search
and the justification for arrest.
(J) The duration of the stop.
Id. at 5 2(a)(3)(A)-(J). The bill provides for grants to be given to law enforcement agen-
cies to collect the data. Id. at 5 3.
74. Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
75. Harris, supra note 1, at 320.
76. INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LEGISLATIVE UPDATES, at http://www.theiacp.org/
leg-policy/Legupdate/legupdate42000.htm (last visited May 10, 2001). The IACP also
criticizes the legislation introduced because it does not specify the way in which the data
is to be analyzed. Id.
77. In 2000, the bill was proposed for a third time. The House Judiciary Committee
has reported the bill and it will go to the House floor. It is uncertain when the bill will be
considered. NEW JERSEY LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, WASHINGTON WATCH, LEGISLATIVE
REPORT, at http://www.cityconnections.com/njleag/wwlegrpt4.html (last visited May
10, 2001).
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Just as federal legislation has been met with some resistance, states
attempting to enact legislation to address the problem of race-based pre-
textual stops have not been successful.7 8 In 1998, both houses of the
California State Assembly passed a bill patterned after the Traffic Stops
Statistics Study Act. 9 Subsequent to the passage of the legislation,
amendments weakening the bill were attached and Governor Pete Wil-
son eventually vetoed the bill.80 A second bill, introduced and passed by
both houses of the state assembly, was vetoed by Governor Gray Davis
who stated that police departments should be encouraged to collect data
on their own.' The failure of legislation on both the state and federal
levels adds to the difficulty in preventing law enforcement officers from
using race as a factor in pretextual stops.
Compounded by the obstacles faced by litigants and legislators, im-
plementation of the Court's ruling in Montero-Camargo seems to run
contrary to the interests of many police officers who believe that racial
profiling is a useful tool. From an officer's perspective, race may serve as
a proxy for a higher probability of criminal activity. 82 An officer may
reason that minorities, particularly African Americans, make up a large
share of those arrested, prosecuted, and jailed in this country. In this
light, racial disparities in detentions are "an unfortunate byproduct of
sound police policies.
8 4
Constantly on the alert for evidence of criminal activity, the officer
85is trained to watch for "traits" that correlate with criminal behavior.
Officers' tendency to link and criminality is in part a result of the type of
thought and analysis in which officers must engage as a part of their
profession. Categorization becomes a necessity in police work in which
officers must synthesize vast amounts of information in short periods of
16time. Police officers' duties involving judging and evaluating behavior,
leading officers to think in "us vs. them terms. 87 As officers begin to
78. Harris, supra note 1, at 321; but see David A. Harris, "hen Success Breeds Attack:
The Coming Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, 6 MIcH. J. OF RACE & L. 237, 240 nn.
11-19 (2001) (listing states that have recently enacted various racial profiling statutes).
79. Harris, supra note 1, at 321 (citing S.B. 78, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999)) (requiring
collection and analysis of data on routine stops).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Harris, supra note 46, at 571.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 986 (1999).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 987.
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associate difference with deviance, a salient cue for difference is often
88
race.
Even if officers recognize that they may not use race as a factor in a
reasonable suspicion analysis, they may do it unwittingly, or subcon-
sciously. Although the ruling in Montero-Camargo implies that officers can
make assessments of criminality independent of their attitudes about race,
social science research shows the stereotypic judgments and biases that an
individual brings to an event fundamentally shape her perceptions. 8 For
example, negative attitudes toward African Americans create a perceptual
norm of viewing African Americans as prone to criminal conduct. 0 Even
if an officer perceives people of color as more likely to engage in crmi-
nal activity than Whites, the perception may be unbeknownst to her:
"[e]specially as it has become less socially acceptable to acknowledge
racial prejudices and because people increasingly tend to view themselves
as egalitarian, discriminatory treatment is often the byproduct of uncon-
scious racism.
' 91
Conscious or subconscious, the effect of racial profiling is that all
minority citizens become probable criminal suspects as police greatly
overestimate the value of race as a predictor of criminal behavior.92 This
point is especially pertinent in light of our country's increasingly multi-
ethnic population. Where "minorities" are quickly becoming the
majority, as in California, officers will not be able to rely on race as a
distinguishing factor, simply as a practical matter: "[w]here the majority
of people share a specific characteristic, that characteristic is of little or no
probative value in such a particularized and context-specific analysis.
94
Just as admissions committees must resort to qualifications other than
grades when the top applicants all have 4.0 averages, police officers will
have to identify factors other than race in conducting pretextual stops
when the population has a high percentage of minority drivers.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 987-88.
90. Id. at 988.
91. Id. at 989 (citation omitted).
92. Harris, supra note 46, at 572.
93. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 1999) (the
court referring to the U.S. Census Bureau as ofJanuary 1, 2000, indicates that "Hispanics
are heavily concentrated in certain states in which minorities are becoming, if not the
majority, then at least the single largest group, either in the state as a whole or in a sig-
nificant number of counties." California has the largest Hispanic population of any state-
estimated at 10,112,986 in 1998).
94. Id. at 1131 (footnote omitted).
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III.
The above analysis suggests that precedence hasn't prepared the
lower courts or law enforcement agents to follow the progressive direc-
tion of Montero-Camargo. While the court in Montero-Camargo noted that
its decision does not conflict with precedent, its prohibition against using
race as a factor in traffic stops should require courts to re-think their
policy of deference to the testimony of police officers. But outside of
court, what can be done to prevent officers from continuing to use race
as a factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis?
One suggestion may be to encourage creation of police department
policy and efforts to self-regulate. Police department self-regulation
makes for better policy decisions, in part because it focuses the depart-
ment on the implications on the community of the police practices being
regulated. 95 The development of department-wide rules reduces the
influence of bias by increasing uniformity in new officer training and
96guiding and controlling discretion.
Where police departments have voluntarily implemented their own
97policies, some have opted to collect data on traffic stops, which has
been proven to be a very effective method of monitoring police discre-
tion. "Police departments ... are in the best possible position to take
action-by collecting data, retraining officers, and by putting in place
and enforcing policies against the racially disproportionate use of traffic
stops. ' Law enforcement officers may be more inclined to follow such
policies if they are created internally. 99
Training and recruitment of officers who are willing to work in
partnership with communities of color is also crucial in changing the
conduct of all officers.' °° Training to promote officers' awareness of their
own biases may be a prerequisite for changing their behavior.'0 t Fur-
thermore, recruiting officers from diverse backgrounds may be helpful.
95. See Harris, supra note 46, at 576-77.
96. Id. at 577.
97. For example, a police department in San Diego began to collect data on traffic
stops without being prompted by the state or federal government. Harris, supra note 1, at
322 (citing Michael Stetz & Kelly Thorton, Cops to Collect Traffic-Stop Racial Data, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, at Al).
98. Id. at 323.
99. Id. (citing Wayne LaFave, Controlling Discretion By Administrative Regulations: The
Use, Misuse, and Nonuse, of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89
MIcH. L. Rayv. 442, 451 (1990) (stating that police-made rules are most likely to be
followed and enforced by police)); see also Hecker, supra note 8, at 593 (stating that law
enforcement may be resistant to external controls.)
100. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 1010.
101. Id. at1Oll.
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A second suggestion is the development of a race-conscious Com-
munity Policing Model, which would counteract negative expectations
that White police officers tend to hold about people of color and expose
police to more positive experiences. 102 Introducing White police officers
to communities of color in less confrontational ways may broaden offi-
cers' perceptions about community members and reduce some of the
antagonistic feelings between police officers and individuals of color.10 3
In addition to police monitoring their intra-department activities,
where a version of community policing has been implemented, police
and civilians have joined together to create civilian review boards that
supervise the activities of law enforcement officials, filter civilian com-
plaints of police misconduct, and recommend action.1 4 Civilian review
boards provide more direct action in response to racial profiling then the
proposed legislation discussed above. Such groups have the power to
hold police officers directly responsible for their conduct. '  Civilian
review boards have benefited communities in several ways; among them,
by assisting in drafting rules placing limits on the use of police discretion
106in traffic stops.
Finally, statistical tracking of race in searches and seizures is another
important tool in implementing a race-conscious police culture; acquir-
ing data on the race of individuals stopped by police provides a useful
foundation for making changes.107
102. Id. at 1009-10.
103. Id.
104. These civilian review boards can be categorized into four classes. See Hecker,
supra note 8, at 595. Class one review boards are the most independent out of all the
classes. These agencies conduct the initial fact-finding, review investigative reports,
receive complaints, and make recommendations during the disciplinary process. Id. Police
officers investigate civilian complaints in class two review agencies. Id. These boards may
also be partially made up of civilians who review the investigative reports and who make
recommendations to a law enforcement executive with regard to what action should be
taken. Id. In class three agencies, investigations and reviews of complaints are done by
police departments. Recommendations are made to the chief executive by internal affiirs.
Boards, partly comprised of civilians, hear any appeals and may make recommendations
of an alternative to the chief executive. Id. Only two cities, San Jose and Seattle, have
implemented class four agencies. Id. In this scheme, the internal complaint review proce-
dures are reviewed by auditors who may make recommendations for procedural changes.
Id.
105. Id.
106. An example of such a rule is one that prohibits law enforcement officers who are
not specifically assigned to traffic duty from making pretext stops except in cases of
exigent circumstances. Id. at 601 (citations omitted).
107. Thompson, supra note 85, at 1010-1111.
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CONCLUSION
Practically, the significance of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Mon-
tero-Camago is largely theoretical. Eliminating race as a consideration in
the reasonable suspicion calculus ultimately will take an effort on the part
of every police officer, for those men and women are the mechanism
through which the law is implemented. Without their commitment to
race neutrality in policing, the court decision alone will be woefully
inadequate to remedy this vast problem.
If links can be forged between communities of color and the law
enforcement officers assigned to them, the Court's vision of more effec-
tive policing in Montero-Camargo is likely to be realized. As officers come
to see the communities they patrol as made up of individuals, instead of a
collective of adversaries, innocent people will be spared the embarrass-
ment and humiliation that results from being wrongfully targeted.
Community members, in turn, will have a reason to view officers with
more trust and respect. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the impor-
tance of police accountability; now is the time to take the steps necessary
to ensure the transition from rhetoric to action.
SPRINc; 2001]
